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1Aligning to Disadvantage: How corporate political activity and strategic homophily 
create path dependence in the firm
Abstract
To what extent should firms get close to government for competitive advantage? What happens 
if they get too close? In this article we explore how corporate political activity (CPA) inculcated 
strategic homophily in leading UK aluminium producer, the British Aluminium Company Ltd 
(BACo), resulting in its path dependence and eventual lock-in. The paper makes three main 
contributions: a longitudinal study of CPA and strategic homophily revealing their 
organizational manifestations and detailed understanding of certain mechanisms of path 
dependence; articulating the value of historical methods and perspectives to exploring 
organizational path dependence; and exploring the impact that prolonged business-government 
relations can have on the organizational behaviour and strategic outlook of the firm with 
implications for TMT selection and environmental scanning. In so doing it responds to calls 
for firms to align market positions with political activity, as well as those for the recognition 
of the value of business history in better understanding the links between CPA and firm 
performance. It further elucidates the longer-term consequences of strategic homophily, which 
has to date focused on the early stages of venture formation. 
Introduction
Heightened awareness of the corporate political activities (CPA) of businesses has resulted in 
a number of scholars considering the effects of such actions on the firm and vice versa 
(Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, and Siegel, 2016). Consistent within 
these analyses are attempts at understanding the social dynamics at play in the cultivation and 
deployment of political links by organizations to gain competitive advantage, with some 
scholars recommending that firms pursue CPA as integral to their strategy (Lawton, Doh, and 
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2Rajwani, 2014). Nevertheless, there remains a lack of understanding of the potential negative 
consequences of pursuing such activities, or their effects if prosecuted repeatedly over time 
(Mellahi et al, 2016). In order to establish a more complete understanding of CPA and its 
consequences for firms, an analysis of its effects over time is thus required. 
This article examines the value of historical perspective in understanding CPA by capturing 
the changing socio-political context and institutional landscape and contingent outcomes on 
the organizational form (Bucheli and Kim, 2014). We draw on a rich historical case study of 
organizational path dependence in the British Aluminium Company Ltd. (hereafter BACo) to 
identify the self-reinforcing dynamics in the TMT’s decision-making and company culture 
arising from the long-term effects of CPA. In this analysis, strategic homophily is shown as the 
principal mechanism by which organizational path dependence becomes embedded within the 
firm when engaged in CPA. 
BACo at its formation exhibited homophily in the form of the narrow social selection of 
directors from elite backgrounds (see appendix). Initially the composition of the TMT, while 
sharing similar social backgrounds, included scientists and engineers (Ristori, Morrison and 
Kelvin), city speculators, lawyers and gentlemanly enthusiasts (Wallace and Cooper). Andrew 
Tait, a renowned corporate accountant joined the board from Ferranti’s, in 1910, and was 
pivotal to the financial restructuring of the company. While the company sought to apply 
pressure on the state to increase military uses of the metal in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, it was the First World War, as for so many other British companies, which 
demonstrated the advantages to be leveraged from proximity to government and prefaced 
BACo’s adoption of strategic homophily. 
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3BACo demonstrated its embrace of strategic homophily through its adoption of a strategy of 
appointing former senior military officers (Charles and Portal) and top ranking civil servants 
(Cunliffe, Plowden and Strath)  (see appendix) as key strategic decision-makers within the 
organisation (‘board capital’) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009), based on their 
intimate knowledge of military and civil procurement processes and their access to senior 
officials and ministers, with the express intention of accessing government contracts and 
reducing uncertainty. This was a marked change from its previous focus of TMT drawn from 
elites from technical and business backgrounds. However, in this case, rather than protecting 
the firm over time, this strategic homophily begun to lock BACo into a dependent path 
threatening its survival. Despite the gains arising from senior BACo managers involvement in 
wartime government, there were already portends of this ‘formation’ of organizational path 
dependence in the 1920s when commercial decisions were compromised to align with the 
serving government’s strategic priorities in exchange for ministers’ political patronage. 
However, the gains of the war and immediate postwar period reinforced the calculation that 
the pursuit of strategic homophily would be advantageous to the company. Once committed 
though, they failed to demonstrate acuity to political and policy changes.  Through these 
strategic appointments, a culture of dependency on government was embedded within the 
TMT.  
The article unfolds as follows; we present a literature review and theoretical framing for our 
approach followed by the methodological analysis and rationale based on archival analysis and 
triangulation. We then provide an empirical analysis of the company’s creation, emergence, 
and eventual decline identifying strategic homophily as the key mechanism for the 
organizational path dependence that occurs. In doing so we consider the initial homophilic 
characteristics of the company in the shared elite backgrounds and networks of directors, and 
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4then subsequently the strategic homophilic acts of recruiting directors from senior military 
officers and civil servants to gain competitive advantage.  It notes how the company became 
increasingly reliant upon government and blind to the changing political and policy 
environment, compounded by the organizational culture inculcated by the selection of such 
staff, which in turn explains the organizational path it followed. As the article explains BACo’s 
path was contingent on the socio-historical context. In our concluding section, we offer a 
theoretical framework linking these concepts as a way of understanding path dependence in 
organizations and how it can arise from strategic homophily (with alignment of market 
priorities to political environment in this case damaging firm performance), illustrating the 
implications for the study of social and political contexts in organizations over time, and 
consider the limitations of our work and potential future research. Finally, an appendix is 
provided in the form of a table containing the names, social positions, political, business, 
military, and educational backgrounds of BACo’s main directors over the period analyzed 
serving as a further evidence base. 
CPA, strategic homophily, and elite networks 
CPA is defined as ‘corporate attempts to shape government policy in ways favourable to the 
firm’ (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani, 2013: 87), and as a component of nonmarket strategy 
has become formalized and established over the last twenty years (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Hillman et al, 2004; Frynas et al, 2006; Lawton et al, 2013; Mellahi et al, 2016), with recent 
work calling for businesses to align their market positions with political activity (Lawton et al, 
2014). Significantly few CPA pieces (Hillman, 2005 being an exception) explore the impact of 
former state actors employed on boards of directors on organizational behaviour and strategic 
decision-making. It is also notable within the CPA literature that, despite Lawton et al’s (2013) 
recognition of its importance, history is not considered a priority for TMT environmental 
scanning but instead deployed selectively as context. 
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5Homophily as a concept finds its origins in sociological enquiry and network analysis. It is ‘the 
principle that a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar 
people’ (McPherson et al., 2001: 416). Homophily has received attention in the business and 
management literature since the 1980s with McPherson and Smith-Lovin’s early analysis in 
voluntary organizations (1987). Since then the concept has been applied both within and 
between organizations on a diverse range of topics such as entrepreneurial alliance portfolios 
(Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009), CEO advice networks (McDonald and Westphal, 2003), new 
venture formation and legitimation (Browder, Aldrich, and Bradley, 2019; Philips et al, 2013), 
team work in organizations (Yakubovich and Burg, 2018), social power and status (Lamertz 
and Aquino, 2004), and minority experiences in organizations (Maranto and Griffin, 2011; 
Derous, Pepermans and Ryan, 2016). 
In business and management scholarship, homophily has been utilized especially in 
organizational and entrepreneurship studies to explore and understand how entrepreneurs 
deploy and advance their social ties and capital to achieve growth in the early days of their 
ventures (McPherson et al.; Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Karra, Tracey, and Phillips, 2006; Ruef 
et al.; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). In an important update on the concept, Phillips, Tracey, 
and Karra (2013) identified strategic homophily as distinctive from homophily, arguing that in 
the literature on the subject “homophily [is] portrayed essentially as an automatic process that 
occurs without the conscious knowledge of those involved” (Philips et al., 2013: 134). Their 
work evidenced how entrepreneurs deploy homophily strategically to build resources in the 
early stages of venture formation, resulting in a positive view of its effects. However, they raise 
the point that 
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6…the strategic use of homophily may inhibit the functioning of a venture by, for 
example, binding underperforming partners to the network and constraining the supply 
of talent. Further research that examines the possible negative effects of the strategic 
use of homophily would make an important contribution to the literature. (Phillips et 
al., 2013: 149)
Taking this distinction between homophily and strategic homophily and addressing Phillips et 
al’s call for exploration of the negative effects of strategic homophily, we further address a 
research gap on its longer-term effects (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000). 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), a salient theme in the CPA literature, is relevant here as 
an exploration of the board as the provider of resources (such as counsel and external links) 
and the effect on firm performance (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman et al, 2009). Hillman and Dalziel have defined the central factor here as ‘board capital’ 
(2003, p.383). Board capital is deployed to ‘help reduce dependency between the organization 
and external contingencies… diminish uncertainty for the firm… lower transaction costs… and 
ultimately aid in the survival of the firm’ (p.386). Hillman et al (2009) detected a generally 
positive association between board capital and firm performance. Pfeffer and Salanick (1978) 
underlined the imperative of a mastery of context to understanding such firm behaviours. Our 
empirical case study provides a valuable opportunity to scrutinize the role of board capital, 
external environment, and contingencies on firm performance. We therefore pose the question: 
what role does CPA, and the aligning of market priorities with the political environment, have 
on firm performance? In particular we explore the unintended consequences of board capital 
in the recruitment of former public servants, military officers and politicians to unlock insider 
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7openings through engagement with the processes that can lead to instances of path dependence, 
in particular examining the effects of ‘strategic homophily’.
Recent work by Maclean et al. (2018) in this journal identified elite networking and cultivation 
of officialdom as key components of the growth of the Hilton International hotel chain in the 
twentieth century. Consistent with this analysis was recognition of the importance of how elites 
engage both within and beyond organizations over time and the social milieus in which they 
operate. Concomitant work by Maclean et al. (2017) discussed the existence of an ‘elite of 
elites’, composed of ‘bridging actors’ who form ‘coalitions to determine institutional 
settlements and societal resource flows’ in France (p.127). The existence of such ‘bridging 
actors’ forging and perpetuation of such settlements and networks is relevant to the 
consideration of the exchanges between elites in business and politics in Britain over the period 
under discussion here. Aluminium’s importance stemmed from its increasing role as a strategic 
raw material to the British state, as well as the closed nature of the industry, making it all the 
more apposite for such study.
Elite networking and cultivation of officialdom are imperative to understanding the operation 
of CPA (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman, 2005) and its impact on strategic decision-making 
and ultimately firm performance (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015; Mellahi et al, 2016). Burt et al 
(2015) in their contemporaneous case study of a defence contractor show how close proximity 
to government resulted in unintended consequences on strategic decision-making leading to 
managerial hyperopia where strategic homophily was apparent in the appointment of former 
senior military officers and civil servants to the board. Zhu and Chung (2014) discuss how 
portfolios of political ties impact on business strategy and the importance of having a 
sufficiently diverse resource base and capabilities to mitigate reliance on ties. Each of these 
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8illustrate the complex nature of political and social interactions that organizations have and the 
impact that this can have on different characteristics, strategies, and operations accordingly. 
Path dependence, history, and self-reinforcing mechanisms 
In an influential piece, Jones and Khanna (2006) argued that ‘history can allow us to move 
beyond the oft-recognized importance of issues of path dependence’ (p. 455). The ‘path 
dependence’ scholarship of Brian Arthur (1994), Paul David (2000), and Paul Pierson (2000), 
has identified a number of properties of ‘path dependence’ within organizations including non-
ergodicity (possibility for a number of outcomes with historical contingencies a key factor), 
non-predictability (indeterminancy of outcomes), and subsequently inflexibility and 
inefficiency, constraining the options of the organization and leading to lock-in. Each of these 
require a temporal dimension in order to be sufficiently explained and understood as they are 
processual in nature and outcomes. Sydow et al. (2009) acknowledged the importance of the 
past in understanding of organizational path dependence, stressing the imperative of 
elucidating the process leading to organizational path dependence rather than economic 
descriptions of the result, and calling for a more critical application of history (p.690):
The starting point of any advanced path dependence thought stresses the importance 
of past events for future action or, in a more focused way, of foregoing decisions for 
current and future decision making. Hence, decisions are conceived of as historically 
conditioned… We learn that history can be quite important for explaining strategic 
choices and organizational failures. 
In seeking to understanding the processes leading to path dependence, Sydow et al propose a 
three-stage framework linking (p.690): ‘(1) singular historical events, (2) which may, under 
certain circumstances, transform themselves into self-reinforcing dynamics, and (3) possibly 
end up in an organizational lock-in.’ 
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9To address this lacuna in the path dependence literature we note literature on cognitive 
explanations for strategic decision-making, and in particular Powell, Lovallo and Fox (2011) 
on behavioural strategy’s historic grounding (p. 1381), and how strategic problems in a 
complex environment may be framed by assumptions shaped by heuristics and biases 
(Schwenk, 1988). In particular, ‘selective perception’, ‘conservatism’ and ‘the illusion of 
control’ assumptions may deceive strategic decision-makers as to their ability to control 
outcomes, limit the strategic options open to them, and prevent the consideration of new ideas 
and revisions. Equally, the identification of ‘hindsight bias’, in which the assumptions over the 
predictability of past events may foster a strategic hubris and assumptions of a status quo are 
pertinent (p. 44). We consider that these may offer an insight into strategic homophily as a self-
reinforcing mechanism that can lead to path dependence – in this instance in the form of 
homogeneity (Apfelbaum, Phillips and Richeson, 2014) and strategic stagnation – and its 
attendant effects on firm performance.
These lead us to our principal research goal of understanding the longer-term effects of CPA, 
strategic homophily, and elite networking on organizations to inform our understanding of how 
path dependence occurs. By showing how strategic homophily evolves over time in an in-depth 
analysis of a company, we illustrate that while it can be of benefit in the early stages in terms 
of legitimising an organization and helping it grow, if left unchecked it can result in path 
dependence towards homogeneity and strategic stagnation. We underline the imperative of 
comprehending this within socio-historical context both for the organisation and top 
management teams. Contrasted against other firms within this story, it also illustrates how such 
contextual factors can conspire to limit the contingent outcomes of the firm. Ocasio (1997: 
196) argues that, ‘The firm’s principles for action, interaction, and interpretation are collective
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10
human constructions that reflect the organization’s history and the history of its environment.’ 
We extend Ocasio’s analysis to include scrutiny of the background histories of the decision-
makers within the firm as well, and situate them in the political economic, and socio-historic 
contexts, offering a multi-level perspective on how such contexts are responded to the firm and 
what this means for our current understanding. In extending Ocasio’s conceptualization of the 
principles for action, interaction, and interpretation in the firm to include this, we seek to 
deepen our understanding of how firm behaviour is constructed and undertaken. 
Based on the preceding discussion, this work is thus guided by three principal research 
questions: How does CPA affect strategic decision-making and firm performance? What are 
the effects of strategic homophily in organizations if they continue to prosecute it beyond the 
initial formation of a venture? How can socio-historic analysis, alongside cognitive analyses 
of strategic decision-making, inform a more nuanced understanding of the development of 
organizational path dependence? 
Research Process
In 1991, Barrett and Srivastval noted in this journal the importance to the understanding of 
organizations of, ‘historicity and continuity of organizational life, and the contingencies and 
decisions made through time’ (p.231). Alvesson and Kärreman argue historical approaches and 
archival research provide an opportunity to better explore the nexus of ‘encounters between 
theoretical assumptions and empirical impressions that involve breakdowns’ (2007, p.1266). 
We stress the contribution of historical methods and perspective to appreciating the value of 
changing context and contingencies to understanding the complexity of strategic decision-
making and organizational culture, specifically through analysing context, change over time, 
causality, contingency, and complexity (Andrews and Burke, 2007; Perchard et al, 2017). By 
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11
combining organizational studies with historical method and perspectives (Maclean et al, 
2016), we seek to illustrate a deeper understanding of the relational aspects between 
organizations and their social milieus. The intention here is to moderate theory (‘history in 
theory’), to elicit ‘evidence to develop, modify or test theories’ (‘history to theory’), and 
provide real ‘historical cognizance’ (integrating historical context and contingency) (Kipping 
and Üsdiken, 2014, p535) in understanding how organizations engage and relate to their 
changing external contexts and how the latter impacts upon the former over time. 
This article uses historical methods to analyze government and company archives, company 
magazines, newspaper reports, and biographies. In doing so, it draws principally on company 
records from the British Alcan (the successor to BACo) collection at the Glasgow University 
Archives Service (GUAS) (Glasgow, UK), along with those of the Reynolds Metals Company 
at the Virginia Historical Society (VHS) (Richmond, VA, USA), Aluminium Pechiney at the 
Institut pour l’histoire de l’aluminium (Paris, France), historical government documents 
predominantly from the National Archives (TNA) (Kew, London, UK) and National Records 
of Scotland (NRS) (Edinburgh, UK), and the personal papers of BACo chairman (1953-1959), 
Viscount Portal (Christ Church College (CCC), University of Oxford, UK). We were aided by 
archivists in the identification of materials relating to the company’s interactions with 
government, its organizational structure and personnel, and strategic decision-making (gleaned 
from board minutes, communications between departments, and exchanges with government). 
Further details on managing-directors and chairman was also collected from newspapers and 
Who’s Who to build biographies. These archival materials are freely available and accessible 
to researchers by contacting the archives. The references to each document used are cited in 
the bibliography, identifying the location for access.
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Archival research relies on a combination of intuitive reasoning, ‘reading sources against the 
grain’ (Jordanova, 2000; Perchard et al., 2017), and recognition of the dualism of approaches 
(Rowlinson et al., 2014). Identification of the significance of silences, and studied sensitivity 
to changing historical context, can be allied with a degree of serendipity in the availability of 
archival collections, as well as completeness, composition and context of collections (Decker, 
2013). As Decker argues, ‘historians put great emphasis on source triangulation and frequently 
highlight the need to work with more than one archive, as this facilitates not only the ‘filling 
of gaps’, but also the identification of bias and silences in sets of records’ (p.163). To make 
sense of the complex interactions we explore in this article we have used multiple sources in 
order to provide a holistic perspective and fill in any such gaps, addressing silences, and 
mitigating biases accordingly. In this case the nomothetic value arising from the single case 
analysis aligned to the wider context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ginzberg et al, 1993; Holt and Popp, 
2013), is illustrated by the explicit recognition ‘that change is multifaceted involving political, 
cultural, incremental, environmental, and structural, as well as rational dimensions’ (Pettigrew, 
1990, p.268) in exploring the relationship between the organizational culture, managerial 
behaviour, and the interplay with contextual and institutional shifts. 
The source materials provide differing perspectives on events and the roles of key actors, 
relationships, and their motivations, within given contexts over time. Used in conjunction with 
company reports, these analyses provide insights, through the choice of language, into the 
culture and ethos of the organization. This provides understanding of how ‘strategic 
homophily’ both perpetuated, and transmitted, characteristic behaviours through an embedded 
ethos and culture, inculcated through a ‘cultural circuit’ (the interplay of individual and 
collective narrative), within a multinational organization over the length of its existence 1894-
1982 (Thomson, 1995). In so doing, we seek, like process studies, to ‘address questions about 
how and why things emerge, develop, grow, or terminate over time’ (Langley et al., 2013, p.1). 
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Temporal bracketing: periodizing British Aluminium Co.
We present the following periodization of the organization’s development stages over the 
longer term, illustrating the changing historical context to BACo’s ‘strategic homophily’ 
arising from its CPA, and emergent behaviour and ultimately growing ‘organizational path 
dependence’ (figure 1). This recognizes Pettigrew’s observation that (1979, p.570): ‘The point 
of studying a sequence of social dramas longitudinally is that they provide a transparent look 
at the growth, evolution, transformation, and, conceivably, decay of an organization over time.’ 
In ordering this we deploy ‘temporal bracketing’ (Langley et al, 2013) ‘to enable the 
identification of specific theoretical mechanisms recurring over time’ (p.7) by building on 
Sydow et al. proposal for a three-stage framework to explain organizational path dependence.
Figure 1: Context and critical event timeline – British Aluminium Ltd.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The organizational analysis of BACo is set against a shifting international and institutional 
context within the wider aluminum industry. The periodization and focus on particular 
incidents in the industry that follow demonstrate strategic homophily in action arising from 
BACo’s CPA and the behavioural consequences of constrained contingency ultimately 
resulting in path dependence. Whilst homophily continued to act as a means of introduction 
and social lubricant for the company, after World War I, BACo as part of its CPA embraced 
strategic homophily by recruiting senior military officers and civil servants in the belief that 
this would give them privileged access to government ministers and officials to unlock 
contracts and investment. Whilst this was partially successful, increasingly this approach led 
to a reliance on government, the blurring of distinctions between policy priorities and the 
commercial strategy of the firm, leading ultimately to path dependence. In this we detect a 
hindsight bias, selective perception and the illusion of control (Schwenk, 1988); principles 
arising from a form of behavioural homogeneity (Powell et al., 2011; Apfelbaum et al., 2014) 
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arising from strategic homophily. Here we also illustrate the contingent paths open to 
competitor firms, Alcan and Reynolds, whose successful arms-length pursuit of CPA was 
distinguishable from BACo’s. 
Pre-formation stage
BACo was formed in May 1894, formed and led by Italian engineer Emmanuel Ristori, holding 
the rights for Britain and the empire. Ristori knew that the British War Office and the Admiralty 
had been conducting tests with the metal from the 1860s but prior to the discovery of the Hall-
Héroult process (in 1886) the cost of aluminium was prohibitive. BACo’s other founding 
director, Roger William Wallace, was a socially well-connected and prominent barrister with 
an expertise in patent law, whose clients included Hiram Maxim and Alfred Nobel, who 
became acquainted with the metal through its use in armaments. At this stage, the TMT 
exhibited homophilic tendencies in terms of the social selection of directors, but not strategic 
homophily. 
The antecedents of BACo’s shift towards strategic homophily was evident in its lobbying of 
government for increased military use of aluminium. Initially struggling for domestic markets, 
senior BACo figures sought to pressurize the British government to find military uses for the 
metal, exploiting concerns about British military preparedness after the second Anglo-Boer 
war (1899-1902) and European armament drives. In their sales brochure for 1908, the company 
stated: 
The advent of aluminium now places a cheaper and a lighter material at the service of 
the War Office... sooner or later the British War Office will follow the example [of the 
Germans and Swiss], and Tommy Atkins will then have cause to thank the light, bright, 
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clean, rustless metal for its share in diminishing the burden (if not the heat) of the day. 
(BACo, 1908) 
By 1909, British military uses of the metal had also increased because of security concerns and 
scientific advances in the alloying of the metal (Graham, 1988). Notwithstanding the growth 
in military applications, BACo’s outlay in large capital projects (constructing its upstream 
smelting capacity and hydro-electricity capacity in the Scottish Highlands) and shortage of 
other domestic markets led to the financial restructuring of the company, led by Andrew Tait 
(Perchard, 2012). At this stage, BACo were starting to recognize the potential benefits of 
military contracts as a means of reducing uncertainty. However, at this stage, BACo had not 
adopted strategic homophilic behaviours in terms of the appointment of senior military officers 
or civil servants to access government ministers and officials.  The context did not allow for 
the company exploiting those activities on a grand scale at that stage, but markets were starting 
to open up for aluminium within metropolitan Britain and the Empire, and BACo would in due 
course have other options. 
The period between 1894 and 1914 constituted a pre-formation stage where the company 
exhibited its use of homophilic tendencies. The additional appointments in April 1910 of 
Robert William Cooper and Stephen Hungerford Pollen continued this trend. Both Cooper and 
Pollen had significant cultural and social capital arising from their own milieus. Cooper (who 
was a Ferranti director) was a ‘well-connected businessman’ (Wilson, 1988; 111). Both Cooper 
and Pollen embodied the homophily that had come to characterize the company and formed 
the antecedence to the strategic homophily that would become clear after 1915. As for many 
British businesses, World War I transformed BACo’s relationship with the state, and provided 
the foundations for its subsequent path to dependence. In this pre-formation stage, BACo’s 
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fortunes were still not predictable and a range of options were open to them. Nevertheless, it 
had limited markets for its products. 
Formation: Conflict and the forging the relationship, 1915 – 1935
For BACo, WWI marked a watershed in their CPA; providing it with immediate opportunities 
to expand its business, smelting capacity, and eliminate competition. This followed the 
reorganization of Britain’s wartime administration after 1915, which brought senior BACo 
officers (and other business leaders) into positions of influence within government, helping the 
company realise its earlier ambitions of encouraging military use of the metal. BACo’s 
chairman, Andrew Tait, and general manager, William Murray Morrison, used their 
membership of key governmental committees and access to ministers to secure initial political 
patronage, and state financial and political support for BACo, both before and after the War. 
Tait and Morrison used their contact with ministers and membership of committees to ensure 
that the industry (which dominated British Aluminium production) was assured of ‘key 
industry’ status and was promised preferred treatment; this provided them with the positive 
feedback necessary to encourage their continued proximity to government (HMSO, 1917; 
TNA, 1918, 1919). The company’s wartime and immediate postwar experience of working 
within government thus fomented BACo’s strategy of recruiting senior military officers to aid 
its competitive advantage. However, it also presaged the problems to come; with that influence 
came both a reliance on government and the understanding that they would support certain 
policies, which led to unforeseen and commercially non-viable investments within the British 
Empire. A case in point being the reluctant decision of BACo to buy bauxite (the ore from 
which aluminium is derived) reserves in the then British colony of British Guiana (TNA, 1920, 
1926).  This was not a commercially advantageous investment for the company but they 
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secured them at the behest of a metropolitan British government concerned about security of 
supply issues to indicate their alignment with state priorities. The ministerial assurances, given 
during wartime and immediately after, which reinforced the benefits of proximity to 
government, were given under very different circumstances (Perchard, 2012, 2013). Not for 
the last time in their history, BACo failed to recognize the acuity of policy change, which came 
by the late-1920s when in a different political climate, Whitehall government departments 
embraced a policy of financial orthodoxy, which effectively negated any wartime assurances 
that the company had secured.  
This stage therefore marks out the key historical phase in which the context of wartime 
cemented the proximity to government and established both the pattern of ‘strategic 
homophily’ in the attempt to align for advantage and behavioural bias. This was to be 
manifested in the form of ‘hindsight bias’, ‘selective perception’, and the ‘illusion of control’ 
(Schwenk, 1988), specifically the assumptions that were made about the static state of relations 
with government based on experiences during wartime service and immediately afterwards 
when closeness had leveraged advantages. This dependence on government was evident in 
utterances of leading company officials, such as those of managing-director Robert Cooper to 
shareholders in 1934 in which he referred to BACo as a ‘key’ national industry. He further 
continued:
We, on our part, have entered into onerous commitments to our Government so as to 
ensure a national supply of aluminium, but under existing conditions it is increasingly 
difficult for us to fulfil those obligations… I cannot refrain from observing that a 
greater measure of support and encouragement from our Government is what our 
national industries await and require (The Times, 28 March 1934).
BACo’s concurrent recruitment of Lt Gen Sir Ronald Charles in 1934 (a senior military officer 
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with unrivalled knowledge of central military planning and procurement) (see appendix), and 
their subsequent deployment of him to access government supply contracts and Treasury loans, 
signaled the company’s move to strategic homophily in key appointments to sustain the firm. 
It also marked a period of convergence between strategic homophily and the formation of 
organizational path dependence, with the portents of this evident through the purchase of 
Guyanese bauxite reserves. 
Lock-in, 1935-1982:
By the mid-1930s BACo’s organizational path dependence, arising from their CPA, was 
complete, inculcated by a strategic homophily which in turn narrowed their strategic vision and 
choices. Overtime, the strategic selection of new directors shifted from senior former military 
officers to retired prominent civil servants reflecting the changing context and state priorities. 
In this case, ‘board capital’ initially served to provide the firm with some security but 
increasingly led to greater uncertainty and ultimately on several occasions threatened its 
survival. This is evident in the key events that follow: the negotiations over loans in the 1930s 
and 1940s; BACo’s takeover (1958-9); and the Invergordon smelter debacle (1967-82). 
Government loans, 1930s and 1940s
The change in political climate, and BACo’s path dependence, were illustrated by the 
company’s approach to the UK government for supply contracts and secured loans in the mid-
1930s. These also illustrated the effects of ‘strategic homophily’ in their attempts to deploy 
‘board capital’ to gain influence within government and capital investment. Seeking to further 
expand its main aluminium smelter in the Scottish Highlands, BACo approached the Treasury 
for a loan, using their newly appointed director, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald Charles on the basis that 
as a former senior military commander he would carry more weight with his audience. BACo 
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used Charles to further press their case for Government contracts and finance for expanding 
smelting capacity before the Supply Board of Committee on Imperial Defence, Principal 
Supply Officers Committee in April 1935. Unlike other committees, this was heavily composed 
of senior staff officers from all the branches of the armed services. They thus felt that Charles 
would carry more weight with this audience. 
Charles’s appointment and deployment in BACo’s dealings with government epitomizes 
BACo’s strategic homophily manifested in its CPA. The Company assumed that Charles’s 
preceding posts as one of the most senior British interwar military planners – as the 
Commandant of the military arsenal (1924-6), the Director of Military Operations and 
Intelligence (1926-31), and the Master-General of Ordnance (1931-4) – would afford them 
privileged access to procurement processes and government funding (GUAS, 1933). Despite 
this, BACo were rejected (TNA, 1935) with one of the Treasury’s most senior officials Sir 
Frederick Phillips considering the company to be far too much of a liability and counselling 
against the loan (TNA, 1936a-c). BACo’s proximity to government meant they lacked acuity 
of the changes around them in relation to government supply priorities. This speaks to Vaara 
and Lamberg’s (2016) identification of the value of historical embeddedness in explaining the 
socio-historical context in which strategic decisions are made.
The extent of BACo’s lock-in was evident from wartime correspondence between Treasury 
and the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) (TNA, 1944a) on the back of a complaint 
lodged by BACo’s Managing-Director, Sir William Murray Morrison:
…a British aluminium producer should not be expected to operate on terms less 
favourable than those accorded to a Canadian aluminium producer. But… we were 
dealing with a Company not under our own jurisdiction and not, therefore, amenable 
to the influences that we can frequently bring to bear upon one of our own contractors. 
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Morrison’s indignation had been sparked by the revelation that Alcan, its chief competitor 
within UK fabrication markets, had received more favourable loan rates than BACo from the 
British government. When BACo discovered this anomaly in 1944, through one of their 
directors, the Hon. Geoffrey Cunliffe, who had been seconded to MAP for the duration of the 
Second World War, they were incensed and demanded an explanation (TNA, 1944a). 
The overriding logic behind the decision was that government could exercise greater influence 
over BACo as a domestic producer close to government, than they could over Alcan as a 
globally competitive operator. BACo felt the injustice given that Alcan and Norwegian 
producers could produce aluminium ingot at one-third the price that it could in its Scottish 
smelters, due to greater hydro-electric capacity at their disposal. Also the Canadians and 
Norwegians benefitted from favourable import agreements for aluminum from the early 1930s 
onwards (Perchard, 2012). The Treasury’s final response was to conclude that it felt little 
sympathy for the Company and that they had been treated “very favourably” (TNA, 1944b). 
These exchanges with government in the 1930s and 1940s illustrate the growing extent of 
BACo’s path dependence arising from their strategic homophily. Having become locked into 
their relationship with government, BACo’s strategic options were now limited, affecting its 
ability to escape its path. That formative path dependence would become further embedded as 
would the continued deliberate practice of hiring from ‘birds of a feather’, as witnessed by the 
recruitment of successive BACo chairman between 1953 and 1959; Viscount Portal and 
Cunliffe, as successors to Pollen and Cooper. The wartime proximity to government was also 
evident in other headquarters staff who had served in various official capacities in government 
(The BA News, January-February 1949). This continuity of elite association was also 
perpetuated through the organization’s culture – with its catechism of loyalty, service and 
patriotism – and selection of management education. In contrast, Alcan’s distinct CPA in their 
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successful prosecution of an arms-length relationships with the British, Canadian and US 
governments illustrated a less constrained contingent path (Perchard, 2012). 
Reynolds-TI Takeover, 1958-59
In the winter of 1958-9 BACo became embroiled in a highly contentious and bitterly fought 
takeover battle with the UK company Tube Investments (TI) and the US aluminium producer 
Reynolds Metals (Cailluet, 2001; Perchard, 2012). Reynolds’s astuteness in political 
maneuvering transformed it (in less than twenty years) from a non-entity within global 
aluminium to a major player in an industry that was characterized by its ‘country club 
atmosphere’ and high degree of oligopolization (Perchard, 2019). The mishandling of the 
takeover battle by BACo’s leaders and ‘pre-eminently establishment figures’ (Roberts, 1992: 
193), Portal (as Chairman) and Cunliffe (as Managing Director), encapsulated the weaknesses 
of the selection of strategic homophily in its recruitment of socially well-connected former 
military officers and officials who were too close to government, and commercially inept, in 
an increasingly competitive global industry. Portal’s fellow directors at Barclays DCO, for 
example, observed that he was out of his depth in the commercial world preferring sporting 
magazines to financial papers (Richards, 1977). 
The takeover battle exposed BACo’s reliance on government, and failure to read the changed 
political environment. In particular, BACo ignored: (a) the Macmillan government’s support 
for US takeovers of British companies to improve competitiveness; (b) the government’s 
vulnerability to claims by the opposition that they were poor stewards of the economy; and (c) 
a lack of appetite on the part of key ministers to oppose the takeover. Portal had expected that 
his connections with ministers, and particularly the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (whom 
he initially approached about the takeover at a shooting party in November 1958), could be 
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used to BACo’s advantage. He deployed these to demand a meeting with the Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan after framing the takeover in terms of economic nationalism (TNA, 1959a).
Portal’s meeting did not go well. Macmillan had already informed Portal that he could not 
personally intervene the preceding November and did not like Portal’s emotional display. 
Portal and Cunliffe had also approached Reynolds’ competitor, Alcoa, with a view to them 
buying a majority share in BACo, which they had kept secret from shareholders, undermining 
any arguments around the government adopting a protectionist position and showing Portal 
to be duplicitous. Further, had Portal and Cunliffe paid attention to the political climate, they 
would have noted that the opposition Labour Party was making political capital out of the 
failure of Macmillan’s administration to modernize the British economy in the run up to a 
General Election. A Cabinet memo discussing the BACo takeover noted, ‘political and 
commercial factors had made it hard to adjudicate expressly in favour of one or other of the 
proposals’ (TNA, 1959b). While Macmillan was privately supportive of US takeovers of 
British firms, he was opposed to the deal with Alcoa, declaring ‘it seems in effect American 
control – and not only of the Company but of all the ancillary services, shipping, etc.’ Portal’s 
connections did little to change BACo’s fortunes in this respect (TNA, 1958). 
The takeover demonstrated how strategic homophily arising out of BACo’s CPA resulted in 
organizational path dependence; Portal and Cunliffe assumed that their connections with 
government and the Prime Minister would protect the Company from takeover but were blind 
to the changing political context. These illustrate a perceptible selectiveness and illusion of 
control (Schwenk, 1988) within BACo TMT’s behaviours. Alluding to the culture within 
BACo (as an analogy for Macmillan’s cabinet), Shadow Chancellor of Exchequer Harold 
Wilson described Portal and Cunliffe as examples of the, ‘hereditary squirearchy… honest 
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chaps, whispering, all of them, the sweet enchantments of a bygone age, good husbands and 
fathers, no doubt, but entirely out of touch with modern industrial society’ (Hansard, 1959). 
That narrowness of vision and limited perception was evident in Portal’s private attempts to 
marshal his elite networks to build public opposition to the TI-Reynolds bid. Portal comported 
himself as BACo chairman as he had as a British military leader and subsequently in his 
postwar government service, manifesting a Weberian moral ‘vocation’ for the company as 
indistinguishable as service to the state (Weber, 1994), arguing against short-termism within 
shareholder capitalism as distasteful in a letter to the prominent British industrialist and 
aviator, Sir Thomas Sopwith (CCC, 1958). 
In contrast, TI-Reynolds had a different outlook. In the aftermath of their winning of the 
takeover battle their spokesperson observed of BACo board’s conduct (especially Portal and 
Cunliffe): ‘If you ask me what mistake they made, I’d reply in one word: arrogance. Their 
kind applauds the rules and practices of capitalism only when it suits them’ (Perchard, 2012). 
After the takeover, a TI-Reynolds observer stated: ‘I believe that B.A. is over-
departmentalised and civil service minded’ (VHS, 1959). In contrast, Reynolds’ successful 
CPA in Washington DC in the 1940s and 1950s bought them considerable competitive 
advantage, centred on their investment in organizational capabilities in their acquisition of a 
sophisticated public affairs machinery (composed of former politicians and officials) that did 
not tie them to government (Perchard, 2019).
After the TI-Reynolds takeover, the Treasury insisted on a 51:49 split with Reynolds in a 
minority shareholding to ensure BACo stayed British controlled and Reynolds did not wish 
to be seen to be taking too central a role; equally the TI chairman Sir Ivan Stedeford (a former 
WWI fighter pilot who chaired the 1963 advisory committee on the state of British transport) 
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was very much an establishment figure. The strategic homophily within BACo continued 
with the appointment of the senior career civil servant Sir Edwin Plowden as chairman 
between 1959-61, then his replacement as BACo chairman, Sir William Strath, another senior 
career civil servant (see appendix). 
Both were establishment figures who did not initiate a change in culture in the BACo 
boardroom, but whom were appointed on the basis of their social milieu, strong government 
contacts, and their intimate knowledge of defence and civil procurement procedures. 
Crucially both men had been party to the shortcomings of Britain’s civil nuclear power 
programme, including the new Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR), and Plowden had 
backed the AGR programme, which was to lead to BACo’s disastrous Invergordon deal 
(Perchard, 2012; MacKenzie, 2012). Much like Charles, Portal and Cunliffe, this was a case 
of strategic homophilic practice designed to use ‘board capital’ to align BACo politically for 
competitive advantage. As the political context had changed, the skills identified for selection 
of TMT members changed principally from military officers to senior civil officials. A 
representative of leading French aluminium producer, Pechiney, reporting back to his offices 
in Paris recorded the palpable air of stagnation in BACo’s London offices just three years 
after the takeover, noting that headquarters staff were utterly demoralised and the company 
lacked a strategy (IHA, 1962).
Invergordon, 1967-82
The Invergordon aluminium smelter was a top-down initiative catalyzed by Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson’s government in 1967 to establish a smelter powered by the AGR nuclear 
reactor power station to provide a competitive advantage against international competitors in 
Canada and Norway who were powered by extensive natural hydro power. After the 
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announcement of the government’s intention to commission two new smelters, three bids were 
received from BACo, Alcan, and a consortium led by RTZ at the BoT’s request in October 
1967 (MacKenzie, 2012). BACo proposed a smelter producing 120,000 tonnes of aluminium 
per year, as well as an associated alumina plant costing a total of £30m to construct (TNA, 
1966). This was identified as the most attractive proposal tendered on the basis that it provided 
the greatest benefit to the balance of payments problem, had the lowest cost of production, and 
the company’s terms for the contract arrangement were the most favourable (RTZ’s proposal 
was the other one selected) (TNA, 1968). 
BACo’s status as ‘British-controlled’ was important in its selection as a preferred operator. Its 
parent company TI was also close to the UK government – its former employee Fred 
Catherwood was the former Director General of the National Economic Development Council 
before later becoming Chief Industrial Advisor to the Labour government in the Department 
of Economic Affairs (MacKenzie, 2012). This was another illustration, alongside Plowden at 
TI and Strath at BACo, of the blurring of interests and the strategic homophily within BACo, 
which would be reflected in the decisions over the smelter contracts.
Negotiations for the smelter were convoluted and time-consuming (NRS, 1973). BACo wanted 
guarantees on the price for the smelter from the electricity board it had to negotiate with for 
power which would initially be drawn from more expensive coal-fired electricity, before the 
intended cheaper electricity could be provided by the newly nuclear power station to be 
constructed. The government assured that any delay in construction of the nuclear power 
station was unlikely to cause problems between the company and the electricity boards and 
that they should agree a contract without any protection or guarantees (TNA, 1973). 
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BACo were very unhappy with this and sought assurance from President of the BoT, Edmund 
Dell, that in the event of any aspect of change in the design of the new nuclear power station 
affecting the price BACo had agreed to pay, the government would concede to alter the 
agreement accordingly so that the company would not be wholly responsible for the extra costs 
as a result. Dell accepted this, but it was not written into the contract, instead taking the form 
of a letter written by Dell to BACo’s chairman Sir William Strath (NRS, 1968). This was to be 
known as the ‘fair clause’ (NRS, 1977), but was not legally binding in any form. BACo, as a 
result of their historic closeness to the UK government, ultimately trusted the word of 
government experts on the cost and completion time of the new nuclear power station.
The smelter opened in 1971 but delays in the construction and opening of the nuclear power 
station resulted in the smelter having to rely on expensive coal fired supply. This resulted in a 
deficit growing substantially and quickly in the smelter’s operations and concerns over its 
viability as a commercial concern. Consequently, BACo invoked the ‘fair clause’ side letter in 
March 1973 arguing that there had been a substantive change in the circumstances surrounding 
the smelter (the aforementioned delays) and the original contract should be renegotiated. It 
took until 1976 before an agreement was made to reconcile the smelter’s deficit and BACo’s 
responsibility with an Act of Parliament to make the payment, totalling £113m, in 1976 
followed by a further £57m in 1977 (MacKenzie, 2012). However, the changes in government 
left BACo exposed without any contractual protection against the rising power cost, delays in 
construction of the nuclear power plant and a volatile global aluminium price. 
BACo’s willingness to rely on the word of government was naïve – the ‘fair clause’ was not 
legally binding, nor did it obligate successor governments to act. The result of this was the 
eventual closure of the smelter in 1981 with the total cost of the smelter coming to £381.1m 
with the vast majority of the amount attributable to the smelter deficit account (Scott and 
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Cuthbert, 1985). BACo was then taken over by Alcan shortly after, having been mortally 
wounded by its Highland misadventure. It exhibited once again their organizational path 
dependence arising from a strategic homophily inured by decades of proximity to government 
with disastrous consequences for the firm’s performance and long-term survival.
The case for strategic homophily.
BACo’s TMT exuded social privilege from its formation. Many of those who graced the 
company’s board throughout its first two decades were drawn from elite backgrounds, mainly 
a mixture of scientists, city speculators, industrialists, with shared social networks, club 
memberships and landed pastimes. This was captured in the personage of the company’s first 
scientific adviser and pre-eminent man of Victorian science, Lord Kelvin (Sir William 
Thomson). BACo embraced homophily. This also fostered a patrician culture, stressing values 
of loyalty and service, which reinforced such behaviours. The pater familias of BACo, William 
(later Sir) Murray Morrison was a former student of Lord Kelvin’s, illustrating the long history 
of homophily based on narrow social selection in the company. 
Struggling to find markets and faced with financial difficulties, the company recognised the 
potential value of growing military uses of the metal before World War I. However, the 
conditions did not yet afford the opportunity to influence government. The experience of World 
War I, especially after 1915 and the recruitment of businessmen into the wartime 
administration (including BACo’s Morrison and Tait), marked a watershed; Tait and Morrison 
were able to leverage advantages for the company through their proximity to ministers and 
membership of advisory committees gaining the state assurances of protection (‘key industry’ 
status) and political patronage. That provided positive reinforcement that encouraged aligning 
with government for advantage. It prompted the company’s embrace of strategic homophily as 
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a means of leveraging the benefits of specific ‘board capital’ to eliminate uncertainty and 
enhance firm performance as integral to their CPA. Strategic homophily within the company 
was epitomised through the recruitment of former senior military officers and civil servants 
with close familiarity and connections within the military, and subsequently civil, procurement 
processes and links to ministers, serving military personnel and civil servants to the TMT, seen 
through a long line of key figures like Lt Gen Sir Ronald Charles, Viscount Portal, the 
Honourable Geoffrey Cunliffe, Sir Edwin Plowden and Sir William Strath.
The persistence of this strategic homophily was also reflected after World War II in the decision 
of BACo to subscribe to and educate its senior management at the Administrative Staff College 
(ASC), Henley (a former RAF staff college) that educated senior civil servants, and the leaders 
of nationalised industries, alongside those of prominent British companies (Dimock, 1956). 
The ASC’s founders made it ‘a meeting place of the two main categories of administrators – 
the officers of the private and of the public services’ (The Times, 7 November 1945). The 
strategic homophily evident in the selection of the BACo board after World War One, and its 
proximity to government demonstrably limited their strategic choices. Portends of this could 
be seen in the formative stage of path dependence, such as in episodes like BACo’s acquisition 
of bauxite reserves in British Guiana against its commercial interest but in alignment with the 
British government’s strategic priorities.  The company’s lock-in was glaringly demonstrated 
through the negotiations over government loans in the 1930s and 1940s, the takeover in the 
1950s and 60s, and eventually the disastrous Invergordon decision in the 1970s and 80s. We 
develop these into an analytical model of the temporal stages and board actions in figure 2:
Figure 2: Longitudinal self-reinforcing mechanisms of organizational path dependence
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
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Discussion
This article seeks to address the recent call by Mellahi et al. (2016) for more business history 
to better understand the links between nonmarket strategy and firm performance, which they 
suggest ‘remains elusive’ (p.147). This responds to a long-standing focus on the link between 
CPA and competitive advantage (Hillman et al, 2004; Lawton et al., 2013), specifically through 
the exploration of RDT. In contrast with the majority of the literature in this area, which 
underlines the positive effects of ‘board capital’ deployment on firm performance, this 
demonstrates how strategic homophily associated with CPA can lead to path dependence. CPA 
deployed by BACo initially had a positive effect of legitimising the business and providing 
some security, before in time locking it into a path which it found increasingly difficult to break 
despite the changing expertise of appointments in its TMT. Work by Lawton et al (2014) has 
suggested that political priorities are aligned more with market ones at a strategic level in 
organizations – our findings here suggest that caution must be exercised so as to ensure it does 
not become the raison d’être for strategy-making and TMT recruitment in organizations. 
Path theorists have identified the challenges in understanding the ‘self-reinforcing 
mechanisms’ that lead to path dependence in organizations (Sydow et al, 2009). Our multi-
level organizational historical analysis illustrates strategic homophily as one such mechanism 
that in conjunction with the micro (individual contingency), meso (organizational), and macro 
(political economic context) factors conflated to lead to its organizational lock-in. The output 
of BACo’s strategic homophily approach to TMT composition and related CPA was a 
homogeneity in its strategic thinking (Apfelbaum et al, 2014), reflected in the firm’s principles 
for action (Ocasio, 1997), selective perception in its continual return to government, 
conservatism in its unwillingness to change tack, and the illusion of control in terms of its 
willingness to approach government as a perceived equal in commercial deals when the 
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opposite was apparent. This was equally predicated on a hindsight bias that assumed a 
predictability based on past events (Schwenk, 1988). Strategic homophily beget each of these 
behaviours leading to organizational lock-in. 
Our findings illustrate the value of historical research in understanding CPA, strategic 
homophily, and organizational path dependence, in testing, modifying and bringing historical 
integrity to that process (Kipping and Üsdiken, 2014; Bucheli and Kim, 2014; Mellahi et al, 
2016). We demonstrate this through the temporal bracketing of social dramas in BACo’s 
history illustrating how pace Sydow et al (2009) historical events can be elevated into self-
reinforcing dynamics culminating in organizational lock-in. We also provide vital insights into 
the ‘strategic use of homophily’ that Phillips et al. (2013) identified, which ‘may inhibit the 
functioning of a venture’ (p.149). Understanding the context, contingency and complexities of 
the flux of the environment informing that is imperative (Pettigrew, 1990; Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2007; Perchard et al, 2017; MacKenzie, 2018) to that explanation. The deliberate 
decision to align with government and strategic homophilic tendencies through the recruitment 
of senior military officers and civil servants after World War I limited their acuity of political 
change, narrowed strategic vision and ossified the organizational culture. Their shared elite 
networks compounded this. This study offers potentially valuable further lines of future 
investigation into elite networking and organizational decision-making, and as a subset of this 
the effects of CPA on board membership and strategic performance specifically around 
resource dependency theory, as well as board diversity. 
Our methodological approach contributes what Maclean et al (2016) identified as: 
‘organizational research that draws extensively on historical data, methods and knowledge, 
embedding organizing and organizations in their socio-historical context to generate 
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historically informed theoretical narratives attentive to both disciplines’ (p.7). Our study of 
BACo’s culture and decision-making provides an illustration of what Vaara and Lamberg 
(2016) have identified as the value of historical embeddedness in explaining the socio-
historical context in which strategic decisions are made. Here we extend that to include the 
political economic context also. The CPA strategy literature, while recognizing the importance 
of history, has demonstrated tendencies to use history selectively as contextual padding as those 
of the main business and management row subjects identified by Perchard et al (2017). 
We maintain that careful consideration of history is crucial to TMT environmental scanning. 
That proximity to government during and after the First World War (and the arising strategic 
homophily) initially leveraged advantages but increasingly hampered strategic decision-
making in the firm and locked it into organizational path dependence. Our analysis shows how 
the political economic and socio-historic context were crucial to understanding BACo’s 
adoption of strategic homophily and ultimately its organizational path dependence. Whilst we 
focus the analysis of strategic decision-making within BACo around a TMT, as identifiable 
both by hierarchy within the company and by attributes in their role in adapting to external 
organizations and events (Hambrick, 2010), we recognize the sensitivities in doing this within 
a historical study of organizations. This is reflected in the demonstrable characteristics of 
strategic homophily within BACo’s TMT as it sought to adapt to changing externalities. 
We acknowledge a number of limitations present in this work. The most obvious is that it is a 
single case study of an organization that ultimately failed. Nevertheless, there is value in 
understanding BACo’s failure, not least due to the findings of Mellahi et al. (2016) who assert 
that the majority of articles on nonmarket strategies report positive outcomes of such 
associations, despite the elusiveness of the nature of such engagements. An in-depth single 
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case study analysis allows for a more detailed understanding of the nature of such engagements. 
A second limitation is that we have only focused on TMT, and not the levels below in the 
organization. This was partly a result of the availability of data and the constraints of article 
length. We cover a period of 80 plus years and overtly focused on the strategic choices made 
by the firm over this period, which necessarily required analysis of the TMT level. 
Nevertheless, we know that strategy is enacted below TMT levels and acknowledge that we 
have not been able to address how. Future work on this may consider how the effects of 
strategic homophily and CPA impact on the organizational structure and everyday activities of 
organizations, both of which remain relatively less well-understood. 
Conclusion
This article demonstrates the long-term effects of strategic homophily arising from CPA, 
offering insights into how the social and official background of TMTs in organizations can be 
detrimental to their longer-term survivability, even if they can initially help provide legitimacy 
and leverage advantages. By engaging in CPA and the strategic homophilous recruitment of 
directors with key military and civil service backgrounds, BACo felt it was aligning itself for 
competitive advantage with UK government priorities. However, by not remaining acute to the 
changing context, it was in fact aligning for disadvantage by locking itself into a path which 
eventually led to its demise. This provides a different perspective on the effects of ‘board 
capital’ on firm performance in contrast with more sanguine appraisals of market and political 
strategic alignment (Hillman and Dalziel; Hillman et al; Lawton et al, 2014; Mellahi et al). 
Extending the extant literature positing the positive attributes of strategic homophily on the 
initial formation of the firm (McPherson et al.; Borgatti and Foster; Ruef et al.; Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt; Phillips et al.), we show how in the case of BACo the deliberate selective strategic 
homophilous recruitment of the Company’s board, integral to its CPA, constrained strategic 
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decision-making and ultimately embedded organizational path dependence. In so doing, we 
address Sydow et al’s (2009) call to explain some of the organizational causes behind path 
dependence. 
INSERT APPENDIX 1 HERE
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Dependence
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Temporal
Bracketing
Board
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